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INTERNAL

1. Leadership: The appointment of A.B. ARISTOV as Soviet Ambassador to Warsaw, announced on February 6, has produced much speculation over whether he has been demoted and what factors underlie his assignment. On Feb. 9 he was listed among the Presidium members who saw L.I. Brezhnev leave for Guinea. Although his appointment raises doubts as to his retention of full membership on the Presidium for long, a number of Western observers agree that there is a good possibility of his remaining on the Presidium as a candidate member like Soviet Ambassador to the GDR M.G. PERVUKHIN. Of the various hypotheses and rumors concerning the underlying causes of Aristov's reassignment, one of the more plausible may be his having been held responsible for the poor selection of local and regional party-government personnel who in turn have been blamed for agricultural shortcomings in their areas. His physical removal to Warsaw (and probable dropping from the RSFSR Bureau) also will prevent his having significant influence in the selection of delegates for the October Party Congress or other possible local personnel shifts and leadership maneuverings prior to the Congress. Aside from a February 1 observation by Khrushchev in Rostov (Pravda of February 5) that the RSFSR Bureau was also one of the various organs whose work was criticized for deficiencies in agricultural leadership, there has been little prior suggestion that Aristov may have been in difficulties.

Khrushchev, reported to have departed from Tbilisi the evening of February 7, appeared on February 9 in Voronezh with G.I. Voronov and RSFSR Premier Polyanskiy for yet another meeting on agriculture--this time for oblasts of the central black-earth belt. Khrushchev and entourage are still scheduled to visit the virgin lands areas of Kazakhstan and the RSFSR, but there are rumors that they will first return to Moscow. A.N. Kosygin has accepted an invitation to visit India in the latter half of this month and may possibly enlarge his itinerary as has Brezhnev, who on February 9 stopped in Morocco for dinner with King Mohammed V on his way to Guinea.

A, a recollection of past glory, ex-leader Marshal K. Ye. Voroshilov was given prominent although brief press attention February 4 on the occasion of his being awarded another Order of Lenin on the occasion of his 80th birthday. N. A. Mukhitdinov continued to be absent from the public eye during the past week.

2. Soviet Armenia Finally to Have 40th Anniversary: Soviet Armenia was to have commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of Soviet power on November 29, 1960. Despite the usual advance preparations for such a big holiday, including a brochure on the subject by former Armenian First Secretary S. A. Tovmasyan, the Yerevan celebration did not take place, nor was there an official notice of postponement or other explanation. (Several Armenians privately expressed the view that it was being postponed in the hope of eventual attendance by Khrushchev.) In the absence of subsequent press attention to the anniversary during a period which saw Armenian agriculture under fire for poor performance in 1960 and the replacement on December 28 of Tovmasyan by Ye. N. Zaryan, the celebration seemed to have been cancelled. The first indication noticed that the

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Armenians are to have their long overdue holiday after all was a report in Trud of February 5 that an ~~art~~ exhibit celebrating the anniversary had opened in Yerevan. Shortly thereafter, Zarghyan, speaking in Khrushchev's presence at the Trans-Caucasus agricultural conference in Tbilisi on February 6 (Pravda, Feb. 7), concluded by observing that the Armenian and Georgian peoples would soon celebrate their 40th anniversary, expressed the hope that "our dear Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev" would come to share the great happiness of the occasion, and noted that the working peoples of Armenia are now engaging in a special production drive and "competition" so as to greet the great holiday with new labor successes." This suggests both that Khrushchev has consented to lend his prestige to the occasion and that the Armenian and Georgian anniversaries may be celebrated simultaneously and to a degree jointly on the Georgian anniversary date of February 25.

3. Rally Scheduled for Inspiring Greater Construction Effort: The central press of February 8 announced a joint Central Committee-Council of Ministers decision to call an all-union conference here March 9-11 of "young builders." To be held in the Great Kremlin Palace for considering the tasks facing "young builders" in steadily increasing the tempo of construction of the most important industrial and transport enterprises and in fulfilling ahead of time the goals of the seven year plan, the conference will include outstanding workers and innovators of the largest construction sites and enterprises of the construction industry, sovnarkhozi, ministries, and departments, personnel of scientific research and planning institutes, party, economic, trade union and Komsomol organizations. To judge from the prominence given the announcement in Pravda which devoted its lead editorial to a condemnation of lags in increasing production capacity for key construction materials, it is apparently intended to be one of the more important mass inspirational meetings at which the "young builder" audience will hear, "discuss" and approve themes and criticism presented by more authoritative speakers, possibly including the most authoritative "old builder" N. S. Khrushchev.

4. Vigilance Campaign: Following the barrage of anti-espionage, vigilance propaganda centering around the issuance of the Soviet "white book" on Western espionage Caught Redhanded, there has been a dearth of vigilance propaganda in the Soviet central press--coincidental with the change-over in US administrations. The past week has seen the appearance of two "vigilance" articles, both in Red Star. In an editorial "Letter", Red Star of February 4 appealed for a greater security consciousness on the part of Soviet armed forces personnel, their friends and dependents in their personal correspondence. The leading example given of compromise of military and state secrets was that of a theft by a stranger in Tbilisi of a letter about to be posted by a Soviet soldier. The stranger later proved to be US Embassy Assistant Military Attache Joseph Raymond [first two names of Captain Ulatoski.]

In "Be Vigilant", Red Star on February 7 reviewed articles by Soviet Armenia and "military group" journal "Soviet Army," all on a vigilance-security theme and with particular emphasis on the security problem posed by Western-directed espionage attempts to penetrate and compromise security of

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Soviet forces in GDR. Vigilance was said to be a most important and constant theme for the Soviet military press.

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

5. US-Soviet Relations: The several sharp notes of criticism which appeared during the week in Soviet press treatment of the new US administration were probably intended in part to restrain any tendency to excessive euphoria on the part of the Soviet public concerning future US-Soviet relations. Izvestiya (Feb. 4) and Pravda (Feb. 5) "Observer" articles subjected the President's State of the Union message -- the full text of which was published only in the weekly Soviet journal Za Rubezhom -- to severe, even if moderately worded, criticism. The President's three directives to the Secretary of Defense were said to be incompatible with his professions of US interest in seeking a solution to the disarmament problem. Other points which drew adverse comment were the passages on Soviet-Chicom aggressiveness, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. Za Rubezhom's remarks that in the foreign policy field the President offered nothing other than intensification of the arms race, and that the message as a whole showed that US ruling circles have not rejected the bankrupt "from positions of strength" policy, went considerably beyond the Pravda and Izvestiya articles whose criticism was modified by reiteration of the wait-and-see approach of previous press treatment of the new administration. Pravda (Feb. 10) noted without comment -- at least for the moment -- the President's Feb. 8 reference to Theodore Roosevelt's maxim "Talk softly and carry a big stick" as a precept to be followed by his administration.

Meanwhile the Soviet press continued to stress American domestic economic difficulties with frequent quotation from recent Presidential statements. The general line of comment on these was that the economic difficulties of capitalism were basically irremediable and that the new administration offered palliatives, not solutions.

6. Laos: (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) Although continuing to identify Laos as one of the main trouble spots in the world at present, Soviet press coverage of Laos dropped off sharply during the past week, to the point where on February 10, there was not a single news item on Laos in the Moscow papers. Earlier in the week the papers indicated that there had been an upsurge in military activity in Laos, caused by the efforts of Phoumi's forces to gain control over the Ventiane-Luang Prabang road, preparatory to an attack on the current Kong Le-Pathet Lao center in Zieng Khuang. Although TASS despatches denied that Sala Phuhun had been captured by Phoumi's troops during most of the week, one newspaper on February 9 reported that Pathet Lao forces were attacking this point, thus indirectly reversing earlier TASS despatches.

The press gave a picture that US policy in Laos is undergoing change: Ambassador Brown's consultation in Washington and a statement allegedly made by Senator Fullbright that the US soon would make new proposals on Laos which, in his opinion, had a better chance of achieving a settlement, were cast in this light.

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The Soviet papers continued to be silent about the January 21 British proposal for reactivating the ICC, and did not mention the reported statement by Chicom Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi that Communist China is prepared to render aid to Souvanna Phouma any time he wants it. . . .

7. New Soviet Sputnik: (Limited Official Use) One possible explanation of the markedly restrained and somewhat defensive Soviet press treatment of the Feb. 4 sputnik launching was that it had not been wholly successful. Conceivably, however, the Soviets wished deliberately to make their space program propaganda more matter-of-fact and routine, both for internal and external propaganda purposes, in order not to encourage excessive expectations of dramatic developments. If this supposition were correct, a stretch-out in the Soviet man-in-space program would seem to be indicated, and indeed what little Soviet comment there was on the Feb. 4 launching specifically denied that the new vehicle contained a human being (or animals), and noted that further experimentation was necessary before manned space flight could be realized. The most authoritative follow-up to the original TASS announcement, an interview with academician Sedov published in Pravda (Feb. 10) made the following points. The sputnik did not contain special apparatus for space research or animals or human beings, was not meant to be recovered, and would soon re-enter the atmosphere and burn up. Sedov's emphasis remained on the success of launching and exactness of placing in orbit.

8. WFTU Executive Committee Resolution: (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) The resolution of the WFTU Executive Committee, issued in Berlin on February 4, was published in the Soviet press on February 7. This document, the first of its kind made public since the November 1960 meeting of Communist Parties in Moscow, bears a resemblance to the December 11 Appeal to the Peoples of the World, especially in that it singles out the US as the motive force of contemporary colonialism. The document, in fact, dealt mainly with colonialism and devoted little attention to the struggle "to prevent war" and the related issue of disarmament or the struggle to improve the condition of workers in the capitalist countries. While identifying a number of colonial issues as requiring major attention of the trade unions, the resolution seemed to be rather non-committal regarding specific action to be taken on most of these issues.

9. Africa: (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) Brezhnev's visit to Guinea, and his stopover in Rabat en route, would presumably give further impetus to Soviet African policy, possibly through offers of increased economic aid. The Soviet press used the Angola incidents for a wholesale attack on Portugal's rule over its African colonies, replete with warnings that the latter's dawn of freedom was fast drawing near.

As regards Congo, the press implied heavily that the US was dragging its feet in the UN Security Council discussions while Mobutu tried to settle accounts with Gizenga in Stanleyville. Belgian and French efforts to recruit European volunteers in order to suppress the "national" forces were the subject of considerable adverse comment. Kasavubu's Feb. 9

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announcement of the new Ileo government was denounced as a trick which did nothing to alter the pro-Western, unconstitutional complexion of the anti-Lumumba forces.

Sudanese rejection of the Soviet request for transit permission for an aid shipment to Stanleyville was not reported in the Soviet press.


10. UAR and Iraq. Several press articles once more made the Soviet public aware of anti-Communist activities in both the UAR and Iraq. (The public is known to be puzzled as to why its government continues to allocate such heavy aid to regimes of this stamp.) Pravda (Feb. 5) reported an appeal published in the London Daily Worker on behalf of 370 inmates of Egyptian political prison camps, with the names of persons said to have been tortured and beaten to death. A Literaturnaya Gazeta (Feb. 7) article "Freedom For Iraqi Patriots" quoted from the WFTU resolution on Iraq adopted at the Feb. 2-4 Berlin meeting of the organization's executive committee. From this it was clear that the Kassem government had ignored previous WFTU appeals on behalf of Iraqi communists. Pravda (Feb. 10) published an appeal on behalf of Iraqi "patriots" to Kassem from the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee which seemed to move Soviet criticism of Kassem into a more direct phase. Previous Soviet press reports implied that Kassem was perhaps not fully responsible for "anti-democratic" repression in Iraq. The direct appeal to the Iraqi premier had the effect of removing this pretence.

MILITARY

11. Soviet Visit by Hungarian Army Leaders. Brief reports continued to be carried in the Soviet press last week of activities of visiting Hungarian military delegation led by Lt. Gen. Lajos ZINYEG and including Maj. Gen. Karol DAPSHI, chief of the political direction of the Peoples' Hungarian Army. Delegation has visited Leningrad and Stalingrad and was received by Marshal Malinovski and other Soviet leaders. Ceremony in which painting commemorating heroic act by Soviet Officer Fedor Shepizin who was killed in saving life of loyal Hungarian army officer LAZLO "during the days of the Counter-revolutionary mutiny in Hungary in 1956" was presented was headlined in Pravda Feb. 4.

Hungarian delegation visit probably related to Warsaw Pact meeting reportedly underway or about to be held in Moscow. However, publicity and emphasis in Pravda Feb. 4 given to activities of Hungarian delegation may be part of continuing effort to rehabilitate reputation of Hungarian army.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR:



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